Friday, May 22, 2020

Divine Simplicity Contributes Nothing to a Modal Collapse

The doctrine of Divine simplicity is widely accused of leading to a modal collapse, but it really contributes nothing to the alleged problem. To see this, consider the case where God has accidents (such as those of knowing, desiring, intending, etc. which are supposed to avoid a modal collapse for creationists). Now we can ask: are those accidents caused or uncaused? If we say they are uncaused, then they are necessary, for nothing can be contingent but uncaused. And if they are necessary, they do nothing to avoid a modal collapse. Suppose then that they are caused. By what are they caused? By the Divine Essence, for that is all that is ontologically prior to them. But the Divine Essence is intrinsically invariable across possible worlds (on pain of God not being a necessary being), and so we would have a modal collapse with respect to the Divine accidents, and therefore with respect to everything. So it is simply a mistake to think that Divine simplicity makes any difference to whether the doctrine of creation ex nihilo leads to a modal collapse.

3 comments:

  1. Counterexample: there is a metaphysically possible world where God refrains from creation. His knowledge of his aloneness is metaphysically contingent, yet it is uncaused.

    On Molina's view, the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are uncaused and yet contingent. Another counterexample. To argue that nothing can be contingent and uncaused is to beg the question.

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    1. Okay, suppose you're right. We can have contingent, uncaused things. Then what prevents the proponent of DDS saying the same about allegedly created things? The modal collapse argument only gets off the ground in the first place if we accept that the contingent things around us need a cause. If we don't accept that, the question of whether God necessitates what He causes never arises.

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  2. I can't say anything about Molinas view, but to accuse someone of begging the question for holding uncaused contingencies to be impossible is little better than the solipsist accusing the other person of begging the question when he insists on his existence.

    For Gods contingent knowledge of being alone, if it is a positive fact at all (i.e. requires a truthmaker) that would be God reframing from creating, so that this knowledge is anything but uncaused.

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